The Determinants and Consequences of Financial Education in the Workplace: Evidence from a Survey of Households by B. Douglas Bernheim & Daniel M. Garrett
NBER WORKING PAPER SERES
THE DE~RMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION IN THE




NBER Working Paper 5667




We are grateful to the National Science Foundation (Grant Number SBR94-09043 and Grant
Number SBR95- 11321) for financial support. Seminar participants at New York University,
Columbia University, and the National Bureau of Economic Research provided helpful comments.
We would also like to thank Merrill Lynch, Inc. for collecting the data required to conduct this study.
This paper is part of NBER’s research programs in Aging and Public Economics, Any opinions
expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
@ 1996 by B. Douglas Bemheim and Daniel M. Garrett. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, maybe quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including O notice, is given to the source.NBER Working Paper 5667
July 1996
THE DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION IN THE
WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY
OF HOUSEHOLDS
ABSTRACT
In recent years, the United States has witnessed significant growth in programs of financial
and retirement education in the workplace. This phenomenon provides an opportunity to assess the
effects of targeted education programs on financial choices. This paper uses a novel household
survey to develop econometric evidence on the efficacy of employer-based financial education.
While our primary focus concerns the effects of these programs on saving (both in general and for
the purposes of retirement), we also examine a number of collateral issues. These include the
circumstances under which employers offer, and employees participate in, financial education
programs, and the effects of these programs on sources of information and advice concerning
retirement planning. Our findings indicate that employer-based retirement education strongly









Stanford, CA 94305-60721. Introduction
In recent years, low rates of saving among U.S. households have attracted considerable attention,
Most of the related public policy debate has focused on the efficacy of tax incentives for saving. From the
available evidence, it is not at all clear that tax policy -- by itself -- adequately addresses the underlying
causes of low saving (see Bernheim, 1996, for a review of the literature). Some recent research departs from
traditional life-cycle assumptions by investigating the possibility that low saving results in part from
“financial illiteracy.” For example, Bernheim (1994a, 1995a) argues that many individuals poorly
understand their economic vulnerabilities, as well as the economic incentives that some tax provisions seek to
create. If so, then education policy may prove to be a powerful tool, either in isolation or in combination with
tax incentives, for stimulating rates of saving. This possibility has recently led the Department of Labor to
launch “a national pension education program aimed at drawing the attention of American workers to the
importance of taking personal responsibility for their retirement security” (Berg, 1995, p, 2),
Unfortunately, there is virtually no hard evidence concerning the effects of education on financial
decisions. Although anecdotal evidence suggests that the post-War increase in saving by Japanese
households may beat least partially attributable to an extensive educational and promotional campaign, there
are other competing explanations for the same phenomenon (see Bernheim, 1991, or Central Council for
Savings Promotion, 198 1). Likewise, correlations between an individual’s general level of educational
attainment and his or her rate of saving (documented by Bemheim and Scholz, 1993, and by Hubbard,
Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995) maybe attributable to other related factors, such as rates of time preference.
The rapid growth of financial and retirement education in the workplace provides useful
opportunities to study the effects of education on financial decisions. As of 1994, 880/0of large employers
offered some form of financial education, and more than two-thirds had added these programs after 1990.1
While this phenomenon is often linked to the increasing popularity of employee-directed pension plans, such
i“Employeesgetting more: Investment education, plaming help on the increase,” Pensions & investments,
January 23, 1995, p. 74.
1as 401 (k)s (see e.g. Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1995), educational programs are also becoming
increasingly common among firms that sponsor only defined benefit plans (see section 3, below).
Employer-based financial education takes many forms, including written materials (brochures, plan
descriptions, f~d prospectuses, newsletters, and memos), one-on-one counseling or financial planning,
seminars, workshops, focus groups, interactive voice response systems, 800 numbers, videos, and interactive
software. Topics covered often include basic investment terminology, asset allocation principles, the
concepts of risk tolerance and risk-return tradeoffs, the effects of inflation, the estimation of retirement
income needs and retirement income sources, retirement strategies, and the impact of preretirement
withdrawals on retirement income. While emphasis varies, nearly all programs cover asset allocation, and
sizable majorities cover retirement income needs (73°/0) and retirement strategies (88°/0).2 Thus, one might
well expect educational measures to affect a wide range of behaviors, including plan participation, voluntary
contributions, portfolio mix, and the individual’s overall rate of saving.
Existing evidence on the effects of retirement education in the workplace is confined to qualitative
surveys and case studies, According to the Employee Benefit Research Institute (1994), 92% of 401(k)
participants say that they read materials provided by their employers; of those, 44% say that they allocate
their funds differently, and 33V. say that they contribute more to their plans. Unfortunately, there is no way
to verify the accuracy of these responses, and in any case the survey did not attempt to measure the magnitude
of the behavioral effects. Employers who enhanced their educational efforts also tend to report increases in
participation (A. Foster Higgins & Co., Inc., 1994), but the available evidence does not establish whether
these increases are out of the ordinary Case studies frequently cite dramatic changes in behavior (see e.g.
Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1995, or Borleis and Wedell, 1994), but the link to education is usually
speculative, and often confounded by other factors. For example, one company views its communications
program as the “most important factor” behind its 92V0401(k) participation rate; yet it also matches 100% of
employee contributions up to the first 3% of compensation (Geisel, 1995)
‘See Employee Benefit Research Institute ( 1995, p. 15).
2The object of this paper is to provide the first econometric evidence on the efticacy of employer-
based retirement education. We make use of a novel survey of U.S. households. Bayer, Bemheim, and
Scholz (1996) address similar questions using data obtained from employers. Both data sources have
advantages and disadvantages. While the employer data is probably more reliable, it does not contain
information on assets held outside of retirement plans. Thus, household data is required to determine the
extent to which educationally-induced changes in retirement portfolios are offset by other changes in
behavior. In section 2, we describe the survey, discuss its limitations, and explore the reliability of the data.
Section 3 provides an analysis of the circumstances under which employers offer, and employees
participate in, retirement education programs. These issues are important for the analysis that follows since
the existence of educational programs, as well as the decision to participate in these programs, maybe
correlated with the characteristics of employ ees.’ Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that
educational progams are t~ically remedial, in the sense that they tend to be offered more frequently in
situations where employees are predisposed against saving. Moreover, there does not appear to be a positive
relation between the decision to participate in educational programs and characteristics that correlate with the
predisposition to save. We find that employers are more likely to offer education in the context of self-
directed plans, but a surprising amount of education is also offered in the context of more traditional plans.
Employees are far more likely to make use of educational offerings, however, when the plan is self-directed.
We also provide an analysis of the effects of employer-based education on sources of information
and advice concerning retirement planning (section 4). This issue is important, since education is not likely to
have a si~ificant effect on behavior if it simply displaces other similar sources of guidance (such as financial
planners). We find that employees do rely on employer-based education to a large extent when it is available.
While education tends primarily to displace sources of questionable reliability (e.g. parents and friends), it
3Asimilar issue arises in the context of the literature that attempts to assess the impact of401 (k)s on saving.
As several commentators have observed, employers may offer 40 I@)s in response to the demands of employees who are
interested in saving, or alternatively employees who are predisposed to save may seek out employers with 401 (k) plans
(see e.g. Bernheim, 1994b, or Engen, Gale, and Scholz, 1994)
3also replaces potentially authoritative sources (e.g. financial planners) to a significant extent.
We find that rates of saving, both in general and for the purposes of retirement, increase significantly
with the provision of retirement education (section 5). Saving for all purposes actually increases by a larger
amount than saving for retirement. We also find that education significantly stimulates participation in and
contributions to 401(k) plans (section 6). These results are particularly striking in light of the fact (discussed
above) that employers tend to offer education in circumstances where employees are less predisposed towards
saving. Due to data limitations, we are unable to study the effects of education on portfolio allocation.
2. The Data
Unfortunately, none of the standard sources of information on household finances (such the Survey
of Consumer Finances, and the Survey of Income and Program Participation, the Panel Study on Income
Dynamics) contain information on employer-based retirement education. To address the nexus of issues
discussed in section 1, it was necessa~ to collect new data.
The first author of this paper has directed an ongoing project, sponsored by Merrill Lynch, Inc., to
monitor the adequacy of personal saving through annual household surveys (see Bernheim, 1995b). For the
Fall of 1994, the survey instrument was expanded to cover a number of new topics, including employer-based
financial education.4 Data were collected during the month of November from a nationally representative
sample of respondents between the ages of 30 and 48. A total of 2,055 surveys were completed.s
The survey gathered standard economic and demographic information, including household assets
and liabilities, rates of saving, earnings, income, pension coverage, employment status, gender, marital status,
age, ethnic group, education, and household composition. It also covered less standard topics, such as
retirement education in the workplace, economic and financial bowledge, sources of information and advice
on retirement planning, and childhood experiences of potential relevance to later financial decisions.
4The survey was desi~ed in cooperation with the til-st author of this paper, and fielded for Merrill Lynch by the
Luntz Research Companies.
5Respondents who terminated their interviews before completion of the sumey are not included in this sample.
4One potential concern is that the survey was administered by telephone. While telephone interviews
are usually regarded as less reliable than face-to-face interviews, the survey was designed to achieve a high
level of compliance and to assure accuracy. Questions were sequenced according to their degree of
invasiveness. This permitted interviewers to establish credibility, to place respondents at ease, and to engage
them in dialogue. Interviewers first asked respondents to assess their own levels of financial howledge, and
then moved on to childhood experiences (whether the respondent received an allowance, held a regular job,
and so forth), sources of information and advice about retirement (including financial education in the
workplace), and questions designed to test economic and financial howledge. Invasive questions concerning
assets and earnings were deferred until later in the survey, and the most innocuous of these (for example, the
household’s rate of saving) were placed before the most problematic ones (primarily those desi~ed to elicit
asset holdings). As a result, rates of refusal were surprisingly low: 79. 1°/0of completed surveys contained
quantitative answers to all questions concerning components of wealth, and 90.4% contained quantitative
answers to all questions concerning earnings. While high response rates are encouraging, it is important to
judge the reliability of the data by making appropriate comparisons with hewn benchmarks (see below).
Table 1 lists variable names and abbreviated definitions. It also identifies each variable as binary (a
dummy), continuous (defined over an open range), or categorical (defined over a discrete set of values).
The survey contains two questions concerning employer-based retirement education. The first asks
whether the respondent’s employer offers seminars, professional assistance, or informative materials to assist
with retirement planning. Answers to this question are summarized by the variable OEBRE, which is set
equal to unity when assistance is available, and zero otherwise. Nearly all respondents (2,037 out of 2,055)
provided valid answers to this question (other than “don’t how” or “refused”), with approximately half
indicating that some form of retirement education is available. The second question asks whether the
respondent has taken advantage of these offerings. This question forms the basis for the variable UEBRE.
Obviously, OEBRE and UEBRE are coarse measures of exposure to employer-based retirement
education. Unfortunately, detailed descriptions of pro~am structure and content are not available. One
5should therefore view this study as an investigation of the average effects of educational activities -- our
analysis almost certainly understates the effects of the best programs. We expect to refine our treatment of
education in subsequent work using more detailed data sources.b.
Several variables listed in table 1measure aspects of pension coverage. RE40 lK indicates whether
the respondent was eligible to participate in “a 40 l(k) or some other tax-defemed salary reduction plan”
sponsored by his or her employer; RP40 1K indicates whether the respondent actively participated in this
plan,. SE40 lK and SP40 IK summarize similar information for spouses. RB40 lK and SB40 lK (for
respondents and spouses, respectively) measure accumulated balances in tax-defemed salary reduction plans
sponsored by pastor present employers.’ ROPEN and SOPEN indicate whether the respondent (or spouse)
participates in any other retirement plan sponsored by his or her employer.
Table 1 also lists a number of demographic variables, the definitions of which are generally self-
explanato~, RED (SED) measures the respondent’s (spouse’s) highest level of educational attainment on a
scale of 1 (no high school degree) to 6 (some post-graduate education in addition to a college degree).
Information-on employment includes earnings and work status. Measured earnings reflects only what
respondents (spouses) made at their jobs or through self-employment (before taxes). LREARN (LSEARN)
is constructed by adding one dollar to the respondent’s (spouse’s) reported earnings, and taking the natural
logarithm.E Respondents were also asked to describe themselves (and their spouses) as a student, housewife,
unemployed, employed full-time by a company other than their own, employed part-time by a company other
than their own, self-employed full-time, or self-employed part-time. Answers to these questions are used to
construct RSE, SSE, RPART, SPART, RNOWORK, and SNOWORK. For our purposes, students,
6More detailed information on educational pl-ograms are contained in surveys of employers fielded by Hewitt
Associates and KPMG Peat Manvick.
‘It is worth emphasizing that these variables reflect eligibility and participation not only for 401 (k)s, but also
for other kinds of plans, such as 403(b)s. We usc (he401 (k) label for notational brevity,
8The addltlon of one dol]ar is necessaly prior to taking the natural 10gtiti because some respondents rePOfis
earnings of zero.
6housewives, and the unemployed are categorized as “not employed,”
The data also contain measures of \vealth and saving. Questions on homes, businesses, other real
prope~, financial assets (including cash, bank accounts, retirement accounts, and other investments such as
stocks, bonds, and mutual funds), and debt are used to construct an all-inclusive measure of net worth, TW,
In some specifications, we also use a transformation of this variable, LOGTW, which is constructed by
resealing TW so that its minimum value is one dollar, and applying natural logarithms. RW measures the
total amount of money that respondents report having saved specifically for retirement. Finally, the survey
collected self-assessed rates of saving, The variables TSAVE and RSAVE measure, respectively,
respondents’ estimates of the percentage of yearly household earnings (not including income earned on assets
and investments) saved in all forms, and the percentage of earnings saved for retirement. The reliability of
self-reported measures of saving is open to question; we return to this issue in section 5.
Table 1 lists two additional variables under the heading “other.” In subsequent sections, these are
generally used as proxies for underlying preferences. PARSAVE provides a measure of parental attitudes
towards saving (scaled from one to five), based on the respondents’ assessments of whether their parents
saved a lot less, somewhat less, the same, someivhat more, or a lot more than other families. TSCORE
measures economic and financial kowledge, based on a series of factual and conceptual questions, g For each
of these questions, we assigned a “relative knowledge score,” defined as the fraction of the population who
gave answers that were at least as far in absolute value as the respondent’s answer from the true mswer.’”
This procedure normalizes the scores for each question to reflect difficulty, so that no question (or group of
questions) dominates the variation in total scores. For questions that require continuous, quantitative
~actual questions concerned rates ofuncmployment, inflation, taxation (in the lowest federal income t~x
bracket), and interest (on 30 year mortgages), and levels of the minimum wage, the federal deficit, federal debt per
household, and Dow Jones average. Conceptual questions probed the respondent’s understanding of real vs. nominal
investment returns and risk-1 -etum tradeoffs.
1‘Suppose for example, that we ask four individuals (A, B, C, and D) the same question. Suppose that the true ,,
answer is “5,” that A answers “6,” B and C ans~ver “8,” and D answers “0.” Then A would receive a score of 100, B
and C would receive scores of 75, and C would receive a score of 25.
7responses, rela[ive knowledge scores are also less arbitra~ than coding answers as “right” or “wrong,”
TSCORE is defined as the average relative knowledge score over the respondent’s answers,
Since the reliability of telephone intcmiews is open to dispute, we have undertaken comparisons
between the Merrill Lymch survey and other recognized data sources. Suitable benchmarks must mimic the
survey’s focus on members of the baby boom generation. One convenient source of information on this
group is a study by the Congressional Budget Office (1993) (henceforth, CBO), which uses the 1989 Survey
of Consumer Finances and the 1990 Current Population Survey. The CBO tabulates statistics for two age
groups: 25-34, and 35-44. For the older group, one can make comparisons with an analogous sample drawn
from the Merrill Lynch survey, Since the CBO’S data were collected four to five years earlier, discrepancies
are to be expected. However, given the slow rate of real wage growth over this period, it is natural to expect a
rough correspondence bcltvecn the sun’eys. Thus, the CBO study provides a meaningful benchmark,
The data contained in the first seclion of table 2, labeled “general characteristics,” indicates that the
composition of the Merrill Ljmch sample differs s?slematically from the comparison sample in several
respects, The most important distinction is Lhathome ownership is much more common in the Merrill Lynch
sample (81. 1°Avs. 65.20/0). Apparently, the chances of contacting a prospective respondent via telephone are
higher for homeowners than for renters. Respondents in the Merrill Lynch sample are more likely to be
married (73, 8% vs. 62.00/0), and are somewhat better educated than those in the comparison sample.
The second section of table 2 contains information on household income. Comparability is
imperfect, since the benchmark statistics refer to total household income, while the Merrill Lynch smey
responses measure total earnings from employment. However, for the age group in question, employment is
the predominant source of household income. With this qualification in mind, there is a striking
correspondence between median household income for the Merrill Lynch and benchmark samples. The
overall median is only slightly higher in LheMerrill Lynch sample ($48,000 vs. $46,359). There is
astonishing little difference across the two samples in median incomes for urunarried individuals, all married
couples, single-earner married couples, and dual-earner married couples. The nmbers match up only slightly
8less well when “thesamples are segmented by educational attainment.
The third and fourth sections of table 2 presents similar comparisons for total household wealth and
non-housing wealth. Reported levels of \vealth are generally higher in the Merrill Lynch sample than in the
comparison sample. For example, the median for all households is $95,000 in the Merrill Lynch sample,
versus $65,433 in the comparison sample. Despite this discrepancy, the variation in median wealth across
subgroups (defined by marital status and educational attainment) is qualitatively similar for the two samples.
The apparent discrepancies in median wealth are easily explained. As indicated in table 2, the CBO
found an enormous disparity between median wealth for homeo~ners ($11 1,068) and non-homeowers
($1,8 11). When the data is segmented in this way, the Merrill Lynch survey matches the benchmarks much
more closely ($126,000 for homeowners, $4,000 for non-homeowners). Thus, the oversampling of
homeo~mers, noted above, leads to the selection of a weallhier sample. One can compensate for this
selectivity by re-weighting the Merrill Lymch sample to produce the same proportion of home ownership as in
the comparison sample (see the final column of table 2). While this results in estimates of median income
that are slightly lower than the CBO’S numbers, part of the difference is probably attributable to the omission
of capital income and transfers. Re-\veighling reduces median wealth more dramatically than median income
(for example, median wealth for all households falls to $61,000, versus $65,433 for the comparison sample).
Given the large variances associated with measures of wealth, there-weighted figures are remarkably close to
the benchmarks (both for total wealth and for non-housing wealth). The largest discrepancy -- net worth for
college educated household heads -- is consistent \vith the corresponding discrepancy for household income.
The final section of table 2 contains information on pensions. Since the CBO does not report this
information, and since we were unable to identify another appropriate published benchmark, we constructed
our own comparison sample using the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). We selected a subsample
to mirror the entire Merrill Ly-nchsample, rather than a restricted age group. Since the SCF did not gather
information on eligibility separately for different tyTes of pensions, we restricted our attenlion to overall rates
of pension coverage. The fractions of married women, single women, and married men with access to
9pension plans are very similar across the tlvo samples. Results for single men are anomalous. This
discrepancy is probably not a significant indictment of data quality since single men comprise the smallest of
the subsamples. Table 2 also indicates that median reported balances in 40 l(k) accounts for the SCF are very
close to median balances in the somewhat broader catego~ of accounts for the Merrill Lynch survey.
In summary, comparisons between the Merrill Lynch survey and recognized benchmarks reveal that
the survey probably oversampled certain population subgroups, most notably homeowners. However, once
one accounts for this phenomenon, medians for income and wealth correspond remarkably closely to
statistics obtained from other sources. Rates of pension coverage are also similar. These findings provide us
with considerable comfort concerning the accuracy of the Merrill Lymch data.
3. The Determinants of Employer-Based Financial Education
The rapid gro~ilh of financial education in the workplace is an intriguing phenomenon. A reading of
the trade press suggests four possible explanations. First, rules governing employer liability in the context of
self-directed pension plans (particularly 401 (k)s) may stimulate educational initiatives. Section 404(c) of
ERISA, which spells out conditions under which an employer is relieved of liability for investment results
when sponsoring a “participant-controlled’ plan, creates an affirmative obligation to provide adequate
disclosure for informed investment decisions. 11 Second, employers may adopt educational programs when
they run afoul of the non-discrimination requirements that preclude the existence of large discrepancies
between contribution rates for highly compensated and non-highly compensated employees. By encouraging
participation among non-highly compensated employees, education may relax binding constraints on highly
compensated employees (see Garrett, 1995, for further discussion of non-discrimination requirements and
“This first explanation is probably of limited impollance. The disclosure requirement is modest, and does not
necessitate activities that are recognizable as meaningful financial education. Indeed, the fact that section 404(c) does
not specifically mention broader financial education has led some observers to fear that the provision of education --
beyond simple disclosul-e -- would create a potential fiducialy liability. The Department of Labor has recently attempted
to alter this perception by drafting an “interpretive bulletin” which is “intended to enable employers, plan officials and
educational providers to distinWish participant education fi-om fiduciary activities and, thereby, encourage these
individuals to institute pa]licipant education programs without fear of inadvertently incumng potential fiduciary liability”
(Berg, 1995, p. 2).
10their effects). Third, employers may offer education when low rates of participation and/or low contributions
confound other objectives. Education may help employees to appreciate the substantial value associated with
their 401(k) options (see Scott, 1995), and thereby reduce their demands for compensation in other forms.
By promoting adequate preparation for retirement, an employer may also hope to avoid subsequent conflicts
with older, poorly prepared workers. Assistance with financial plaming may also enhance employee loyalty,
improve labor relations, and boost morale. Fourth, if workers are interested in retirement planning, they may
ask their employers to provide educational materials along with other benefits.
It is important to investigate the impetus for employer-based retirement education, as well as the
factors that motivate individuals to make use of these programs, prior to studying the effects of this education
on financial choices. Participation in an educational program, like participation in a 401(k), is probably
correlated with underlying tastes for saving andor risk. Even the availability of education, like the
availability of a 40 l(k), may be correlated with tastes. However, in contrast to the example of 40 l(k)s, there
is no presumption that eilher the receipt of, or eligibility for, retirement education ispositively correlated with
a predisposition to siive. With respect to participation, those with sufficiently high propensities to save may
choose not to make use of educational offerings simply because they have already informed themselves
adequately on the subject of retirement. And with respect to availability, the sign of the correlation between
education and underlying tastes for saving differs across the various hypotheses discussed above.
Under the first hypothesis, correlations between education and the predisposition to save may result
from correlations between education and 40 l(k) eligibility. However, this hypothesis has no implication
concerning the sign of correlation between education and tastes conditional on the existence of a 40 l(k).
Thus, as long as one controls for 40 l(k) eligibility when studying financial behavior, the direction of the bias
is not obvious. Under the second and third hypotheses listed above, education is remedial, and -- conditional
on the existence of a 401 (k) -- tends to be offered more frequently in situations where employees are
predisposed ugainsf saving. Consequently, if either of these hypotheses is valid, studies based on cross-
sectional data (including the current paper) lvill tend to be biased against the finding that education stimulates
11saving. Under-the fourth hypothesis listed above, the resulting bias might well work in the opposite direction,
since high-saving employees may be more likely to demand investment education as a fringe benefit.
In a related paper, Bayer, Bemhcim, and Scholz [1996] investigate these hypotheses using data on a
sample of employers suneyed by KPMG Peat Marwick in 1993 and 1994. They find that low rates of
participation among non-highly compensated employees significantly increase the likelihood that employers
will establish or enhance educational offerings. No other variable compares in importance as a predictor of
subsequent educational activity. This evidence is most consistent with the third hypothesis mentioned above,
and supports the view that educational offerings tend to be associated with a predisposition against saving.
The remainder of this section investigates the factors that influence the availability of financial
education in the workplace, and the decision to make use of this education. It sheds additional light on the
relative merits of the four hypotheses discussed above, as well as on the nature of correlations between the
receipt and availability of education, and the underlying predisposition to save.
A. Availability of employer-based retirement education
A strong relation between the availabilih of education and pension eligibility is apparent in the raw
data. Overall, just over one-half (53.5%1) of respondents report that their employers offer some form of
retirement education. Of those without pensions, only 26.6°/0 say that educational programs are available. In
contrast, 68.9°/0of those covered only by 401 (k)s, 58 .OO/O of those covered only by other pension plans, and
76.4% of those covered by both ~-pes of plans report the existence of educational options. 12 Since these
options have become common even in the absence of401 (k)s, the growth of self-directed plans does not
appear to be the sole factor motivating the growth of retirement education in the workplace. 13
12Arelatively small number of those who describe themselves as “not working” nevertheless report that their
employers offer some form of retirement education. These respondents may have in mind educational programs offered
by past employers, their spouse’s employer, or a school that they attend.
13Concelvab]v, “other pensions“ may include some self-directed plans, However, our “401(k)” category is .
intended to include “other tax-dcfelTed salary reduction plans,” which subsumes many other common self-directed plans,
such as 403(b)s. Of course, some I-espondents may have misclassified their pensions, but misclassification would have
to be extremely common to explain the obselwed diflkrences between those with and without other pensions. Notably,
Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz (1996) colTobol-ate our tindlngs using employer survey data
12Table 3 contains estimates of probit models explaining the availability of retirement education at the
respondent’s workplace. Obsemations were dropped if the respondent was not employed or answered “don’t
know” or “refused” to any of the questions used to elicit the values of the explanatory variables. These
variables fall into four categories: information on pension eligibility, demographic characteristics, aspects of
employment, and “other,” which includes a constant and taste proxies, discussed belo}v.
Equation (1) explores the relation between the availability of education, characteristics of the
respondent’s job, and demographics. We include the demographic variables because they may be related to
the type of job held by the respondent; it is also conceivable that they maybe related to tastes, and that the
coefficients of these variables may reflect self-selection among employment opportunities, Equation (1)
omits three variables that we regard as more straightforward proxies for tastes (SE40 IK, TSCORE, and
PARSAVE), The estimates reveal that, as expected, workers with pensions are much more likely to have
access to retirement education.. While the existence of a 401 (k) plan is particularly important, the presence
of other pensions is also strongly related LOeducational offerings. The relative sizes of the coefficients for
ROPEN and R2PENS indicate that the existence of another pension plan on top of a 40 l(k) contributes
significantly to the probability that retirement education is available. Women, non-whites, highly educated
individuals, and highly compensated individuals are significantly more likely to work for employers who offer
retirement education. There is little evidence that education is more widely available for older workers: while
the coefficient of RAGE is positive, it lacks statistical significance.
Equation (2) adds three variables that arguably proxy for tastes, in an attempt to illuminate the
relation between the availability of education and underlying tastes for saving. The first, TSCORE, measures
the respondent’s economic and financial knowledge. Respondents with higher values of TSCORE tend to
have significantly greater wealth (see section 5). Thus, either TSCORE measures an aspect of tastes for
saving (financial literacy), or it is correlated with unobserved characteristics that determine tastes for saving.
One potential difficulty with the inclusion of TSCORE is that retirement education may improve economic
and financial knowledge. However, the direct ion of the resulting bias is clear: if there is no correlation
13between the availabili~ of education and tastes for saving, the coefficient of TSCORE would be positive.
Unless education impairs economic Iitcracy (which seems very unlikely), a negative coefficient would suppofi
the premise that education is typically provided as a remedial measure to those who are less inclined to save.
The second variable, PARSAVE, proxies for saving by the respondent’s parents. PARSAVE should
be correlated with tastes as long as tastes are, at least to some extent, inherited from parents either through
“genes” or childhood experiences. There is no reason to expect that the correlation between rates of saving
by parents and children would necessarily be positive. For example, respondents with frugal parents might be
inclined to save less than others if they expect to receive large inheritances. However, in practice, there is a
strong positive correlation between wealth and PARSAVE (see section 5).
The third variable, SE40 lK, indicates whether the respondent’s spouse is eligible for a 40 l(k). Since
SE40 lK (unlike RE40 lK) is not an attribute of the respondent’s job, it should have no direct effect on the
Presence or absence of education at the respondents wor~Place ILmaY7however, have an indirect effect
Several authors (including Bcmheim, 1994b, 1996, and Engen, Gale, and Scholz, 1994) have argued that
401(k) eligibility is positively correlated with the predisposition to save If this is correct, then SE40 lK
should be a reasonable proxy for tastes as long as household financial decisions are influenced by the
preferences of both spouses, or as long as tastes are correlated across spouses. 14
The addition of these taste proxies does not significantly alter any of the results discussed above
(compare equations (1) and (2) in table 3). The coe~cient of TSCORE is negative, large in absolute value
relative to those of other important explanatory variables, and statistically significant at a high level of
confidence. The coefficient of SE40 lK is also negative, but statistically insignificant, while the coefficient of
PARSAVE is positive and statistically insignificant. This pattern of coefficients suggests that the presence of
retirement education is negatively correlated with the predisposition to save.
]4Conceivably, SE40 IK may also be correlated with aspects of the respondent’s job (since 401 (k) eligibili~ is
correlated with characteristics, such as skills, that may affect assoflive matching); however, it is unlikely that significant
systematic correlations exist once one controls fol-the respondent’s earnings, education, pension status, and other
characteristics.
14To ftilier examine the legitimacy of this inference, we performed the same exercise for a probit
model explaining the respondent’s 40 l(k) eligibility. It would be implausible to suggest that 40 l(k) eligibility
is negatively correlated with the predisposition to save. Thus, if TSCORE, PARSAVE, and SE40 lK do
indeed proxy for tastes, their coefficients should be zero or positive, in sharp contrast to the results obtained
for educational offerings. Controlling for the same set of variables as in table 3, we find that the coefficients
of TSCORE and SE40 lK are both positive and significant at exceptionally high levels of statistical
confidence, while the coefficient of PARSAVE is negative but statistically insignificant (we have omitted the
estimated equations to consewe space). These results are at least consistent with the view that 40 l(k)
eligibility (unlike the availabiliw of education) is positively correlated with the predisposition to save.]s
B. Usage ofemployer-bnsed retirement education
Overall, 77% of respondents with access to retirement education in the workplace report that they
make use of these opportunities. This is lower than the 92°/0figure (which refers to the fraction of workers
who read written materials provided by their employers) reported by EBRI (1994). The usage rate is higher
for workers covered only by 40 l(k)s (79.9Yo) than for workers without pensions (69. lYo). However, those
covered only by pensions other than 40 l(k)s are no more likely to participate in educational programs than
those who have no pension coverage (69.2°/0 vs. 69. 170), and those with both 401 (k)s and some other plan are
no more likely to participate than those covered by 40 l(k)s alone (80.2°/0 vs. 79.90/0). Thus, the existence of
a pension plan does not appear to affect the likelihood of worker participation in retirement education
offerings unless the plan has self-directed features that require active participant decision-making.
These same patterns are evident in estimates of a probit model explaining the decision to use
educational offerings, conditional upon availability (table 3, equation (3)). While the coefficient of RE40 lK
IsThl~~vldenceis by no means conclusive. If 401&)s encourage ~eater saving, then they may also induce
individuals to acquire greater financial bowledge. This would account for the positive correlation between401 (k)
eligibility and TSCORE. The correlation with SE40 IK is more difficult to explain, particularly given that we have
controlled for a range of respondent characteristics, including ea]mings and education. To some extent, the correlation
may be attributable to households in which [he husband and wife have the same employer, but we doubt that this
circumstance is sufficiently common to explain the magnitude of the estimated coefficient.
15is large and statistically significant, the coefficients of ROPEN and WPENS are not. This finding contrasts
with our results regarding the factors that determine the existence of educational programs (section A).
It is also instructive to compare the coefficients of the other explanatory variables in equations (1)
and (3), While women and non-whites are more likely to work for employers who offer retirement education,
their usage rates are not higher. Educational offerings are more common for those with higher earnings, but
participation is not. Married individuals are more likely to participate (the difference between married and
single respondents being significant at ihc 90°/0level of confidence), but not more likely to work for an
employer who offers retirement education. And while RED and RPART emerge with coefficients of the same
sign in both equations, the estimates arc imprecise. Overall, the dissimilarity of coefficients between these
two regressions suggests that the existence of retirement education in the workplace is not demand driven --
factors affecting the pattcm of availability appear largely unrelated to factors affecting the pattern of usage.
Analogously to section A, we also add our taste proxies (TSCORE, PARSAVE, and SE401K) to
investigate the possibility that the use of retirement education is correlated with underlying tastes for saving.
In this context, it maybe lCSSappropriate to think of SE40 lK as proxying for taste, since its coefficient may
reflect a behavioral response: respondents may choose to participate in educational programs to learn how to
manage their spouse’s 40 l(k) assets. Indeed, lhe coefficient of SE40 IK in equation (4) is positive, but
insignificant. While the coefficients of TSCORE and PARSAVE also lack statistical significance, both are
nevertheless negative. As before, if educalion improves economic and financial knowledge, we would expect
to observe a positive coefficient for TSCORE unless participation is negcrfively correlated with innate
sophistication. Since all three variables are strongly related to wealth and saving (see section 5), and since
TSCORE and SE40 lK are strongly related to the respondent’s401 (k) eligibility, these results suggest that
participation is not positively correlated with the predisposition to save. We are only moderately surprised by
this finding. Those who are most inclined to save may have already educated themselves, and may view the
low-level, remedial financial education offered by most employers as redundant.
164. Sources of Information and Advice
A central objective of this paper is to determine whether employer-provided financial education
influences employee behavior. Education might not affect behavior for a number of reasons, Workers might
simply ignore it if they are uninterested, unmotivated, unable to understand it, or already well-informed, A
more subtle possibility is that the information provided by employers might substitute for information that
employees would have obtained from other sources. For example, an employee offered free investment
counseling might stop paying for the advice of a financial planner. If this kind of substitution occurs, then
employer-based financial education may serve as a tax-favored form of in-kind compensation, rather as an
activity that should be expected to measurably alter the financial choices of employees,
mile it is essential to examine actual behavior, our survey also permits us to investigate directly the
extent to which employees rely on emplo)er-provided education and to measure the displacement of other
information sources, Specifically, each respondent was asked to name the household decision-maker’s most
important source of advice and information on retirement planning. Respondents were offered fourteen
possible answers, as well as the opportunity to provide an “open” response. We recoded these responses into
six categories: employer, financial professional, parentifriend/relative, print media, own judgement, and other,
The first two columns of table 4 contain data on the distribution of primary sources of information
and advice, tabulated separately according to whether the respondent’s employer offered financial education.
When education is offered, 27,0% of respondents report relying primarily on their employers, compared with
only 7.4°/0of employees in instances where employer-based education is not offered. Thus, many employees
apparently regard employer-based financial education as a critical source of information and advice.
A comparison of the distribution of primary sources of assistance for those with and without
employer-based financial education provides some evidence on the extent to which this education displaces
other specific sources of assistance. The fractions relying on parents/friends/relatives, own judgement, and
“other” sources are much lower in the presence of educational programs, while the fractions relying on
arguably authoritative sources (financial professionals and print media) are only slightly smaller. This
17pattern suggests Lhat,for the most part, employer-based education may displace less authoritative sources of
assistance. If so, there is a greater likelihood that the behavioral effects of education are significant.
Of course, these simple tabulations maybe misleading. In section 3, we found that respondents’
characteristics differ systematically according to whether employer-based education is available. For
example, education is offered more frequently when the respondent’s employer provides a401 (k).
Employees who are eligible for 401 (k)s tend to have higher incomes, more education, and greater financial
sophistication. They also tend to rely on more authoritative sources when making financial decisions. Thus,
raw statistics may understate the extent to which employer education supplants authoritative sources.
To control for these other factors, we estimated a multinominal Iogit equation explaining the
respondent’s primary source of assistance as a function of education, pension eligibility, demographic
characteristics, employment information, and similar characteristics for spouses (when present). To conserve
space, we omit the full set of parameter estimates, and instead summarize our central results as follows.
Setting OEBRE equal to zero. we use the parameter estimates to fit a probability distribution over sources of
assistance for each observation in our sample. We then average these probabilities across observations to
create a fitted population distribution. Next, we set OEBRE equal to one and repeat the calculations. Results
are reported in the two righlmost columns of Table 4. Slightly less than half (8.1 percentage points) of the
16,7 percentage point increase in reliance on employers reflects displacement of authoritative sources
(financial professionals and print media). The remaining 8.6% reflects displacement of parentsifriendsl
relatives, the respondent’s own judgement, or “other” sources, Thus, although employer-based education
displaces authoritative sources of assistance to a larger extent than was apparent from the raw data,
displacement of non-authoritative sources appears to be more common. This finding supports the view that
education has significant potential to influence behavior.
The full set of multinominal logit coefficients are difficult to interpret since the impact of any variable
on the use of any pafiicular source of assistance cannot be inferred from any one coefficient. We therefore
estimate six separate probit equations -- one explaining the use of each information source -- and report
18results in Table 5. Note that the coefficient of education is large, positive, and statistically significant in the
equation explaining reliance on employers. This finding is inconsistent with the view that employees ignore
employer-provided education. Education also has a negative and statistically si~ificant effect on the use of
print media, the respondent’s own judgement, and “other” sources of assistance.
Although we are primarily interested in the effects of education, other patterns are of independent
interest. Respondents with pension coverage rely less on parents/friends/relatives, and more on print media.
Women appear more Iikcly to rely on employers, financial professionals, and parents/friends/relatives, but
less likely to rely on print media and their o~~m judgement.’b More highly educated individuals depend more
heavily on financial professionals and print media, and lesson employers and other sources. Reliance on
parents, friends, and relatives declines \vith age. As one might expect, the self-employed are less likely to say
that they rely on assistance from employers.’7 as are those who work part-time or not at all (though the
coefficients of these last two characteristics are only marginally significant).
We conclude that many employees rely heavily on financial education in the workplace, and that this
education most commonl)’ displaces non-authoritative sources of assistance (though si~ificant displacement
of authoritative assistance also occurs). Thus, there is considerable scope for employer-based education to
affect financial choices.
5. The Effect of Retirement Education on Household Saving
We now turn to the critical question of Ivhether retirement education in the workplace significantly
affects saving behavior. In this section, we investigate the relation between employer-based education and
four different behavioral variables: total net worth (TW), the total value of all assets which the respondent
characterizes as savings for retirement (RW), saving for all purposes expressed as a fraction of current
lGConceivably, diRerences in I-epolled usage by gender may reflect differences in reporting, rather than
differences in usage. For example, men maybe more likely to credit their own judgement after the fact.
IT~en a se]f.emP]oYed respondent repolts relying on an employer, this may refer to a sPouse’s ‘mPIOyer>‘r ‘0
educational programs set up primarily for the respondent’s employees.
19income (TSAVE), and saving for the purpose of retirement expressed as a fraction of current income
(RSAVE). The first two variables measure stocks of wealth, while the last two measure flows,
The use of information on flow saving is particularly impofiant in this context. As mentioned in
section 1, most retirement education programs have not existed for very long. The effect of education on
flows should be proportionately larger, and more easily detectable, than the effect on stocks of wealth because
stocks reflect all past choices, including those made prior to the availability of education. Also recall that the
existence of financial education is negatively correlated with the predisposition to save (see section 3 or
Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz, 1996). Thus, in cases where educational programs are sufficiently recent,
stocks of wealth may actually be 10wer for those who have access to employer-based education, even if
education stimulates rates of saving. These considerations are less problematic for retirement wealth than for
total wealth since stocks of retirement wealth are ~~ically very low to begin with (a given change in rate of
flow should manifest itself more quickly in the stock when the range of initial stocks is small).
This discussion suggests a procedure for distinguishing between causal hypotheses. If education
stimulates saving, and if it is negatively correlated with the underlying inclination to save, its estimated effect
on flow saving should be particularly pronounced, and its impact on retirement wealth should also be
detectable. Education may nevertheless appear unrelated to, or even negatively correlated with, total net
worth, Moreover, it would be difficult to account for this pattern under any other hypothesis. For example, if
education is ineffective but positively correlated with the imate inclination to save, one would observe
positive and equally strong effects for all of our dependent variables.
Several important issues arise with respect to the use of the flow variables. First, self-reported rates
of saving are suspect because they do no necessarily retlcct the consistent application of economically
appropriate concepts. For example, some individuals may report the fractions of their paychecks that they
put away, while others may (despite the wording of the questions) count some portion of reinvested capital
20income (e.g realizations) as both income and saving.l E This disadvantage is at least partially offset by the
fact that questions about rates are less invasive than questions about asset values; as a result, one obtains
higher response rates, and possibly more honest answers. It is also obvious from the results reported in this
section that the variables TS AVE and RSAVE contain more than random noise. They are highly correlated
with total net wealth (presumably reflecting serial correlation in rates of saving), and they exhibit the
expected correlations with variables such as 401(k) eligibility and education, even controlling for wealth.
Absent either a true panel or a detailed log of household spending, self-reported rates of saving are the only
available measures of flow saving. While TSAVE and RSAVE are imperfect, they do appear to provide
meaningful information on flow saving, and are therefore worthwhile subjects of analysis.
Second, the distinction between total wealth and retirement wealth, and the analogous distinction
between the overall rate of saving and the rate of saving for retirement, may be imprecise and subjective.
Some individuals may earmark funds for particular purposes, while others may regard their resources as
f~gible, While these distinctions are sharper when individuals use targeted retirement savings vehicles (e.g.
IR4s, 40 l(k)s, variable annuities. and life insurance products), some individuals may save for retirement
through other vehicles, or save for other objectives (such as college education) through a retirement account.
Despite these issues, high response rates indicate that most individuals do have a sense about the portions of
their wealth and flow saving that are psychologically, if not physically, earmarked for retirement.
In examining the relation between saving behavior and education, one must also be cognizant of the
fact that the response to education may vary systematically across the population. While most Americans
probably save too little, some save adequately, and a few probably put away significantly more than is
necessa~. If educat ion nudges each household toward an appropriate mode of behavior, its impact on low
and average savers may bear little resemblance to its impact on high savers -- even the sign of the effect may
“It is worth noting that no respondent reports negative saving, despite the fact that some households
undoubtable dissave. This probably reflects the fact that most individuals do not thiti about saving and dissaving
symmetrically. For those who dissave, it is probably more natural to report that they save nothing (a saving rate of zero)
than to report a negative rate of saving.
21differ. For this reason, it is very important to distinguish between mean effects and quantile effects.
Traditional regression techniques such as OLS may systematically understate the importance of education
precisely because the effect of education on mean saving is diluted by the response (or lack thereo~ among
those who already save enough. A separate but related concern is that, due to the pronounced skewness in the
distributions of reported wealth and rates of saving, OLS estimates maybe driven by the behavior of a
relatively small number of individuals with the greatest inclination to save. For these reasons, we rely in this
section primarily on quantile regression techniques (although, for completeness, we also report OLS results).
Before discussing the regression results, it is useful to summarize the key patterns in the raw data.
The median ratio of total net worth to yearly earnings is iower for those whose employers offer retirement
education (1.76) than for those \vhose employers do not (1.97). It is also lower for those who make use of
these offerings (1.75) than for those who either do not make use of, or do not have access to such programs
(1.89). These findings are difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that education is positively correlated
with the underlying inclination to save; indeed, lhey support the opposite inference.
It is therefore quite striking that much diffcrent patterns emerge for retirement wealth and flow
saving. The median ratio of retirement wealth to annual earnings is higher when the respondent’s employer
offers retirement education (0.35 3 vs. O.192). It is also higher for those who make use of these offerings than
for those who do not (0.364 vs. O.195). Median rates of saving and rates of saving for retirement are also
higher for those who have access to retirement education programs (10VO and 5Y0,respectively) and for those
who make use of these programs (again, 10O/o and 50A)than for those who are ineligible (6°/0and 30/0),and for
those who are either ineligible or who don’t participate (6Y0and 4Yo).
The patterns in the raw data coincide with those predicted at the outset of this section, under the
hypothesis that retirement education is remedial (and therefore negatively correlated with the predisposition
to save) and effective at stimulating saving. In light of the negative correlation between retirement education
and total wealth, it is difficult to rationalize the positive correlations between educational offerings, retirement
wealth, and flow saving as consequences of a spurious relation between these offerings and tastes for saving.
22Of course, the raw statistics maybe misleading. As shown in section 3, educational offerings are
correlated with other factors that may influence saving. It is therefore important to determine whether the
central empirical patterns su~ive once one properly controls for a range of pertinent characteristics.
Table 6 contains four median reg~essions -- one for each dependent variable, The explanatory
variables include the availability of retirement education in the workplace (OEBRE), pension characteristics
for both respondent and spouse (if any), the demographic characteristics of both respondent and spouse,
characteristics of emplo~ent for both respondent and spouse (earnings and work status), and “other”
controls, including taste proxies (TSCORE and PARSAVE) and the log of total wealth (LOGTw. LOGTW
is, of course, not included in the rcg~essions that explain stocks of wealth. Its Inclusion in the specifications
explaining flow saving is justified by the usual life cycle considerations, which imply that its coefficient
should be negative (since higher wealth should increase consumption). However, if preferences towards
saving are reasonably stable over time, it may be more appropriate to think of LOGTW as another taste
proxy, in which case one would expect a positive coefficient. Table 7 presents analogous results for UEBRE.
The use of both OEBRE and UEBRE requires some comment. Conceptually, it may seem more
appropriate to control for participation in educational programs (UEBRE), rather than the mere availability
of such programs (OEBRE). We are concerned, however, about endogeneity. While either variable may
be correlated with factors that determine a respondent’s underlying predisposition to save, this concern is
more pronounced in the case of UEBRE. 19 One can think of specifications that control for OEBRE as
reduced forms, in which we have substituted an expression explaining UEBRE.
In the specification for total wealth (Table 6), the coefficient of OEBRE is positive, though quite
small in magnitude, and statistically insignificant. Thus, while the addition of other control variables
(including taste proxies) eliminates the negative correlation between OEBRE and median wealth, there is no
“For OEBRE, the issue of endogeneity depends onty on the factors that motivate an employer to offer
f~cial ducation. If, as we hfive ar~ld, ducation is remdial, the coefficient of OEBRE will be biasd
downward. With respect to UEBRE, the bias depends not only on the factors affecting the availability of education, but
also on the characteristics that motivate an employee to use an available program.
23positive relation to speak of. In contrast, the estimated effect of OEBRE on median retirement wealth is large
(nearly $2,500) and statistically significant. The availability of retirement education also increases the
overall rate of saving by 165 percentage points, and raises the rate of saving for retirement by just under one
percentage point. Bolh effects are large relative to median rates of saving for those who do not have access to
retirement education in the workplace (6 percent and 3 percent, respectively), and both are statistically
significant at high levels of confidence. Notably, the estimated effect on the overall rate of saving is larger
than the estimated effect on retirement saving. This suggests that retirement education may have a positive
spillover effect on saving outside of retirement accounts..
We are again struck by the finding that education is strongly related to retirement wealth and flow
saving, but not to total net worth. We reiterate that this is consistent with the pattern predicted at the outset
of this section, but inconsistent with the hypothesis that education is correlated with unobsen’ed tastes for
saving. One might question this inference on the grounds that some spurious factor, such as poor
measurement of total net worth, could explain the discrepancy. However, if this was the case, then one would
also observe similar discrepancies for other variables. It is therefore notable that the coefficients of RE40 lK
are all positive and statistically siyificant. Indeed. the coefficient of RE401K in the specification for total
wealth is particularly large. The coefficients ofSE401 K etiibit a similar pattern,
It is tempting to interpret the coefficients of RE40 lK and SE401K as behavioral effects, and to
conclude that 401 (k)s also stimulate saving, Caution is warranted, however, since there is a strong
presumption that the correlation between 401 (k) eligibility and the predisposition to save is non-negative. If
anything, our results strengthen this presumption. Note that the coe~lcients of RE40 lK and SE401 K in the
equation for total wealth are nearly four times as large as the corresponding coefficients in the equation for
retirement wealth. If we interpret these coefficients as behavioral effects, we would be forced to conclude that
40 l(k)s crowd in olher saving at the astonishing rate of four to one, Strictly speaking, this finding does not
rule out a behavioral interpretation; for example, it is consistent with a powerful “recognition effect.”
However, if such an effect exists, it is difficult to understand why the effect of the respondent’s 401(k)
24eligibility on the total saving rate is less than its effect on the retirement saving rate (which implies some
crowding out, rather than crowding in). We aretherefore inclinedto attribute some unknown portion of the
coefficients for 401 (k) eligibility to correlations with unobsemed tastes.
Since our focus is on the effects of financial education, we will touch only briefly on the other
coefficients reported in table 6. Eligibility for other pensions is associated with greater wealth and higher
rates of saving, although none of the estimated effects (with the exception of ROPEN in the equation for
retirement wealth) is statistically significant. The interpretation of the coefficients for the marital status
dummy (which are statistically significant in the wealth equations) is obscure, since all variables measuring
spousal characteristics arc given fixed default values (usually zero) for single individuals. The coefficients of
FEMALE and BLACK are uniformly negative, but lack statistical significance. General education is
positively related to wealth for both the respondent and spouse, and to flow saving for the respondent (the
relations between flow saving and spousc”s education are statistically insignificant),20 Wealth is strongly
related to age, but flow saving is not; there is very little evidence that rates of saving accelerate over the age
range covered by our sample. Earnings arc positively related to wealth, but there is only weak evidence that
the rate of saving rises with earnings. Self employed individuals have more total wealth (~ically in the form
of businesses), but they do not have more retirement ~~calth, and they do not tend to save at higher rates (the
associated coefficients are negative and statistically insignificant). Not surprisingly, part-time employees
save at significantly lower rates. However, there is no indication that they have less wealth.2’ One-earner
households have greater wealth, but they do not appear to save at higher rates,22
‘“There are many possible explanations for this linding General education may proxy for permanent income,
or for patience; it may also provide analytic skills lhat cent]-ibute to more deliberate decision-making.
“There are several possible explanations for Lhistinding. First, recall that we control for earnings. Suppose
that a part-time worker has the same earnings as a full time worker. If the part-time worker has worked full-time in the
past, then he or she has greater past earnings. Thus, he or she might well have greater wealth. Second, the decision to
work part-time may be endogenous. An individual may select this option only if he or she has suficient resources to
tiord it.
‘zOne can explain this finding analogously to the coefficients of RPART and SPART. Holding current
earnings constant, one-earner households may have higher past earnings than two-earner households, since the non-
working spouse may have wol-ked in the past. Alternatively, having one spouse stay at home may be a luxury, chosen
25Our taste proxies uniformly have the expected signs. In the total wealth and retirement wealth
specifications, the coefficients of both TSCORE and PARSAVE are large and statistically significant at high
levels of confidence. While the statistical significance of these variables is diminished in the saving rate
regressions (PARSAVE remains si~ificant, while TSCORE does not), this is in part due to the inclusion of
LOGTW, which enters with positive and highly significant coefficients. This finding, which appears to
contradict the implications of the life cycle h~othesis, implies that LOGTW acts as a superior taste proxy.
We obtain similar results for specifications that control for participation in educational programs
(UEBRE, table 7). As with OEBRE, we find essentially no relation between UEBRE and total wealth. The
coefficient of UEBRE is slightly smaller than that of OEBRE in the equation for retirement wealth (though
still statistically siWificant), and larger in the equations for flow saving. The use of UEBRE, rather than
OEBRE, does not dramatically alter the pattern of coefficients obtained for other variables.
To ftiher investigate the robustness of our results, and to develop additional evidence concerning
possible spurious relations between education and underlying preferences for saving, we conduct some
additional exercises: To conserve space, we omit detailed results, and summarize key coefficients in table 8.
We focus hereon the specifications for flow saving, since this is where the effects of education are
most pronounced, Table 8 is divided into four sections, \vhich are distinguished according to whether the
explanatory variables include OEBRE or UEBRE, and whether the dependent variable is TSAVE or RSAVE.
Each of these sections contains the coefficients for education (OEBRE or UEBRE) and 401(k) eligibility
(RE401(k) and SE40 l(k)) from five equations. Each regression controls for the same set of explanatory
variables used in tables 6 and 7, except where othcnvise noted. For purposes of comparison, the first entry in
each section provides the key coefficients from the “basic median re~essions” reported in tables 6 and 7.
We motivate our first robustness exercise as follows. If the availability andor usage of education is
correlated with underlying and (at least to some extent) unobserved preferences for saving, then, absent an
ideal instrument, bias is inevitable. If education is negatively correlated with the predisposition to save, then
only by households that have accumulated sufficient wealth to afford it.
26the estimated effects of education should be biased do~~mward,and the inclusion of taste proxies should
reduce (but not eliminate) this bias. In conlrast, if education is positively correlated with the predisposition to
save, then the estimated effects of education should be biased upward, and the inclusion of taste proxies
should again reduce (but not eliminate) this bias. Thus, we can shed light on the sign of the bias by omitting
the taste proxies, and examining the resulting changes in the key coefficients.23
The second entry in each of the four sections of table 8 presents the key coefficients from a median
regression in which we have removed the taste proxies (TSCORE, PARSAVE, and LOGTW). Note that, in
eve~ case, the estimated coefficient of education declines, while the coefficientsofRE401 (k) and SE40 l(k)
increase, This contrast is significant because of the presupposition that 40 l(k) eligibility is positively (or at
least not negatively) correlated with the predisposition to save. These tindings provide further support for the
hypothesis that both OEBRE and UEBRE are negatively correlated with the predisposition to save, We are
therefore inclined to believe that even our basic median recessions understate the true impact of education.
Our second robustness exercise involves the estimation of quartile regressions for the 25th and 75th
percentiles of the population distribution, as well as OLS regressions. The comparison of effects for different
quartiles is of interest since, as noted previously, the impact of education should be most pronounced among
low savers. The results in table 8 indicate that the effects of OEBRE and UEBRE on total flow saving are
smaller at the third quartile (75th percentile) than at the first quartile (25th percentile), as expected. In
addition, the effects of education at the first quartile and at the median are statistically significant, whereas
the effects at the third quartile are not. Mile the absolute effect of education does not decline monotonically
23The argument in the text abstracts fi-omthe possibility that certain taste proxies (TSCORE and LOGT~
may be tiected by education and by underlying atti~udes towards saving. This complicates, but does not fundamentally
alter the logic of the exercise. Suppose [hat education increases saving. Consider two individuals with the same level of
LOGTW, one of whom has received retirement educat ion, and one of whom has not. On average, the one without
retirement education must have a greater predisposition to save. Thus, controlling for LOGTW induces a negative
partial correlation between education and (he taste fo]-saving, thereby biasing the coefficient of OEBRE (or UEBRE)
downwards. A similar argument applies for TSCORE. The omission of the taste proxies eliminates [his bias, but
increases the bias associated with correlations belween OEBRE (or UEBRE) and unobserved tastes. If education is
negatively correlated wilh tastes for saving, then the two etiects work in opposite directions, and the omission of the taste
proxies can in principle move the coefficient of education in either direction, However, if education is positively
correlated with tastes for saving, the two effects work in Lhesame direction, and the omission of the taste proxies should
unambiguously increase the coefficient of education.
27across quartiles (it is greater at the median than at (he first quartile), one must keep in mind that respondents
at the first quortile save very little to begin wi[h (only about 2°/0of income in the absence of education,
compared with 6°/0at the median). Thus, the first quartile effects represent Imger proportionate increases
than the median effects. A ve~ different pattern of coefficients emerges for401 (k) eligibility. The
magnitude of the coefficient for RE40 l(k) is similar across quartiles -- there is no decline at the third quartile,
although statistical significance is reduced. For SE401 (k), by far the largest effect is found at the third
quartile; indeed, no impact on saving at the first quartile is evident.
Table 8 also contains results for flow retirement saving. For both OEBRE and UEBRE, the
estimated effects at the third quartile are similar to lhose at the median, and somewhat larger in magnitude
than at the first quartile. Howe\’er, when OEBRE is used, the effect at the third quartile is not statistically
significant, whereas the effects at the median and first quartile are. Also, the proportional change in behavior
is much larger at the first quartile. Again, these results contrast sharply with our findings for 40 l(k)s. The
size of the estimated coefficients for RE401 (k) and SE401 (k) increase monotonically as one moves from the
first quartile to the median, and from the median to the third quartile.
The finding that education is generally Icss effective among those more inclined to save is consistent
with our predictions, and provides additional evidence that our results are not attributable to spurious factors.
Since the reasons for making this prediction are peculiar to education, we take ftiher comfort from the fact
that no such pattern is apparent for our measures of401 (k) eligibility
We have included OLS reg~essions for the sake of completeness. The coefficients of UEBRE are
smaller, but remain statistically significant. The coe~cients of OEBRE are also smaller, and statistical
significance is only marginal in the case of total flow saving. Since the skewness of saving causes OLS
results to be disproportionately influenced by high savers, the weakening of our results is not surprising. For
the reasons expressed earlier in this section, we believe that the quantile regressions provide more reliable and
complete information on the effects of education.
286. 401(k) Activity
As discussed in section 3, the growth of employeedirected retirement plans has been a major
factor contributing to the emergence of employer-provided fimncial education. It is therefore natural to
investigate the behavioral consequences of education in the context of these plans.
Educational offerings are strongly correlated with participation in a 401(k) plan. Rates of reported
participation are 83.5 % among respondents when education is available, compared with ordy 70.4% when
it is not. Of those who use educational offerings, 88.470 participate in 401(k) plans, while the participation
rate is ordy 64.4% for those who have access to, but do not make use of these offerings .*4 Account
balances follow a similar pattern. Men education is offered, the median 401(k) balance for respondents
(counting eligible non-participants as zeros) is $8,250, compared with ordy $5,000 among those for whom
such programs are unavailable. Those making use of educational offerings have median plan balances of
$10,000, while those failing to make use of available education have median balances of only $4,000.
It is also possible that the availability of education has a positive spillover effect on rates of
participation in 401(k)s for spouses. Indeed, the participation rate for spouses is 86% when employer-
based education is available to the respondent, compared witi 74% when it is not available to the
respondent. The difference in median balances is smaller for spouses than for respondents: $6,000 when
education is offered to the respondent, versus $5,000 when it is not.
Of course, the subset of employees who have access to employer-based financial education is not
typical of all those who are eligible for 401(k)s (see section 3). Inasmuch as that subset tends to be less
sophisticated and less pre-disposed to save, the raw correlations may understate the effec~ of education on
participation. In the remainder to this section, we investigate the relation between education and plan
24Reported rates ofpa]licipalion in our sample (78V0for respondents, 79~0for spouses) are slightly higher than
estimates based on su]veys of employers. Hewitt and Associates (1993) repoll average plan-we i@ted participation
rates of 750/o;the average participant-weighted figure is 720A. Papke, Peterson, & Poterba (1993) calculate an average
participation rate of 76% based on a small 1990 survey of employers. Some previous household surveys also yield
lower participation rates. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1993) report a rate of 70.8% based on 199 I data from the SIPP.
Given that participation rates have been rising, our fi~res do not appear to be far out of line with past estimates.
29activity, controlling for other personal characteristics.
Ideally, one should control for plan features, such as the rate at which an employer matches
contributions, as well as individual characteristics. The available evidence on the effects of these features
is mixed.n If education is more common among employers who offer matching contributions, and if
matching provisions increase participation, then our failure to control for match rates may impart an
upward bias to the coefficient of education in our regressions. There is, however, no reason to assume
that the correlation between match rates and education is positive. One might expect to observe a positive
correlation if employers differ in their desire to make their plans attractive, and if those intent on
enhancing their plans offer both education and matching. However, if employers view education and
matching provisions as substitutable methods of stimulating participation (e.g. to satisfy non-discrimimtion
requirements), then these provisions might be negatively correlated. In practice, employer survey data
indicate that tie correlation between matching and educational efforts is slightly negative, and statistically
insignificant (see Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz, 1996). Thus, the failure to control for matching is
probably unimportant, and if anything may cause us to understate slightly the effects of education.
Other features of a 401(k) plan, such as loan provisions or the number and variety of investment
optiom, may also influence participation. Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz (1996) do find a small positive
correlations between education and certain other plan features. However, on the basis of the existing
evidence, it is doubtful that these other features dramatically affect participation or contributions; hence,
their omission is probably not very important.
The first two columns in Table 9 contain estimates of probit specifications explaining the
respondent’s 401(k) participation, conditioml on eligibility. The explanatory variables include our
25AccOr~~g to paPk-, Peter~On, & poterb~(1993),the existence of matchg contributiorrs ‘ic~~ses
participation rates by 15percentage points. They cannot, however, reject the hypothesis that participation rates are
depedent of the size of the match. Scott (1995) conchldes that both the existence of a match, d the size of the
match, are positively associatd with participation. Papke (1992) finds that low match rates increase the share of
salary contribute, but at high match rates (i.e. 50%), there appears to be a negative effat. Andrews [1992]
concludes that the existence of a match increases partic ipation rates but dwreases cent ribut ion levels.
30measures of education (OEBRE in equation (1), and UEBRE in equation (2)), other pension variables,
demographic characteristics, aspects of employment, and two variables used as proxies for underlying
tastes regarding saving (TSCORE and PARSAVE) ,Z6 Our central finding is that OEBRE and UEBRE both
enter with large and highly statistically significant coe~lcients. This result is not sensitive to the inclusion
of taste proxies. Indeed, in contrast to other measures of wealth and saving examined elsewhere in section
5, the respondent’s participation in 401(k) plans appears to be essentially unrelated to the taste proxies.
To provide some sense for the importance of education, we calculate fitted probabilities that the
average eligible respondent would participate in his or her 401(k) plan when education is available
(OEBRE equals 1), and when it is not available (OEBRE equals O). The availability of education increases
the fitted probability by 11.8 percentage points. We also conduct a similar calculation, fitting probabilities
for each value of UEBRE. This exercise indicates that rates of participation are 19.5 percentage points
higher for those who make use of education than for those who do not.
While we are primarily concerned with the effects of education, other aspects of the reported
regressions are also of interest. Participation is less likely when the respondent is eligible for another
pension plan, but the statistical significance of this result is margiml. Spouse’s pension eligibility does not
appear to affect respondent’s participation. While neither marriage nor gender influences participation,
blacks appear less likely to participate (with moderate statistical significance). Surprisingly, there is no
significant tendency for participation rates to rise either with general education or age. Respondent with
higher incomes are much more likely to participate, but spouse’s income has little effect on respondent’s
participation.
We now turn our attention to the respondents’ account balances. Following our previous practice,
we initially present results based on median regressions. These are contained in the two rightmost columns
of table 9 (equations (3) and (4)). The estimated effect of OEBRE on 401(k) balances is almost exactly the
ZSHere ~Veonly ~e[aln the spousal cha]-acterislics that appear mOStpertinent. symmetrically> ‘e ‘liminate a
number of respondent characteristics fl-om speciticatlons explaining spouse’s 40 I(k) activity (table 10). None of the
omitted enters wi[h a statistically significant coeticicnt, or meaningfully affects the reported results.
31same as its effect on retirement wealth (table 6). The estimate is less precise (due to the reduction in
sample size that results from confining attention to those eligible for 401(k) s), but still significant at the
90% level of confidence. The coefficient of UEBRE is slightIy larger than the corresponding effect on
retirement wealth (table 6), and highly significant. As in section 5 (table 8), the omission of our taste
proxies (TSCORE and PARSVE) reduces both the size and statistical significance of the coefficients of
OEBRE and UEBRE (we omit details to conserve space). This pattern again suggests that our imbility to
control fully for tastes leads us to utiers?afe the true effects of education.
Table 9 reveals that accumulated balances rise significantly with the respondent’s age and
earnings. Part-time respondents also have larger accumulated balances (see footnote 21 for possible
explamtions). Aside from TSCORE, none of the remaining explanatory variables enter either
specification with statistically significant coefficients.
Next, we investigate the possibility that education for the respondent has positive behavioral
spillovers on spouse’s 40 l(k) activity. Results on participation and contributions are contained in table 10
(the structure of which parallels that of table 9). The estimated relation between education (OEBRE and
UEBRE) and participation (equations (1) and (2)) is quite pronounced. Aside from OEBRE and UEBRE,
very few explamtory variables enter these equations with statistically significant coefficients. Spouse’s
education and spouse’s earnings are positively related to participation, and spouses who work part-time are
less likely to participate, Just as spouse’s earnings were poor predictors of the respondent’s participation,
respondent’s earnings are poor predictors of the spouse’s participation.
Equations (3) and (4) of table 10 reveal a small positive relation between the availability of
education at the respondent’s workplace and spouse’s median 401(k) balances. However, the coefficients
of OEBRE and UEBRE are statistically insignificant. Our estimates of the specifications for spouse’s
401(k) balances resemble the corresponding estimates for respondents (table 9, equations (3) and (4)) in
that spouse’s balances rise with spouse’s age and earnings, but are umffected by the respondent’s
characteristics. However, there are also a few differences. Spouse’s balances fall when the spouse is
32eligible for another pension (perhaps indicating some degree of substitution), and rise with the spouse’s
education. Also, the coefilcients of part-time work and TSCORE are insignificant. The latter finding
perhaps indicates that TSCORE is a better proxy for the respondent’s tastes than for the spouse’s tastes.
Analogously to section 5, it is possible to shed further light on the relation between education and
401(k) balances by examining behavior at quantiles other than the median. There is, however, reason to
anticipate a somewhat different pattern of coefficients in the current context. As in section 5, one would
expect to find strong behavioral effects, both for respondents and for spouses, among those least inclined
save (that is, at lower quantiles). However, to the extent education promotes greater contributions from
to
non-highly compensated employees, it relaxes the non-d iscrimimtion requirements that limi t contributions
by many aggressive savers. This in turn impels the constrained, aggressive savers to contribute more,
regardless of whether they themselves actually use the education. z’ These observations have specific and
distinctive implications. At higher quantiles, we expect to find some relation between respondent’s 401(k)
balances and education, and this relation should be stronger for the avaiMifi~ of education (OEBRE) than
for the usage of education (UEBRE). In contrast, since OEBRE pertains to the respondent ‘.sworkplace, it
camot influence non-discrimination constraints at the spouse’s workplace. We therefore expect to find
little or no relation between spouse’s 401(k) balances and measured education at higher quantiles.
We test these predictions in table 11. To conserve space, we omit detailed regression results, and
report ordy the coefficients of educatioml variables. For purposes of comparison, the table lists the
pertinent coefficients from the “basic median regressions” of tables 9 and 10, as well as coefficients for
regressions at the first and third quartiles. For the respondent’s plan balances, the effects of education
(either OEBRE or UEBRE) are somewhat smaller in absolute value, but larger proportiomtely and
considerably more significant statistically, at the 25th percentile than at the median. We also find a
statistically significant relation between spouse’s plan balances and education at the 25th percentile, even
27This might or might not show up as an increase in the rate of retirement saving, depending on the extent to
which 401 (k) saving displaces othel- retirement saving for highly motivated savers
33though this effect was difficult to detect at the median. These findings strengthen our inference that the
effects of education are most pronounced among those who are least inclined to save. As predicted,
neither OEBRE nor UEBRE appear to affect spouse’s plan balances at the 75th percentile. Similarly, the
coefficient of UEBRE, though positive, is s~tistically insignificant in the corresponding equation
explaining respondent’s 40 l(k) balances. However, the effect of OEBRE on respondent’s balances is large
and statistically significant at the 75th percentile. It is difficult to account for this pattern urdess the
availability of education at the respondent’s workplace relaxes nondiscrimimtion requirements by
encouraging contributions from low-saving, non-highly compensated employees.
Overall, the evidence indicates that employer-provided fimncial education significantly increases
rates of participation in and contributions to 401(k) plans. Part of this effect appears to reflect the
relaxation of non-discrimination comtraints that would otherwise reduce the contributions of highly
motivated savers. Education also has significant spillover effects on the participation rates of spouses, and
on the plan balances of spouse’s among those who are least inclined to save.
7. Conclusions
In this study, we have provided the first systematic evidence on the determinants and consequences
of financial education in the workplace. Our analysis suggests that education is ~ically offered as a
remedial measure, most common] y in the context of participant-directed pension plans. Holding the features
of pension plans constant, education therefore tends to be inversely correlated with factors that predispose
individuals toward saving. We find that significant numbers of employees rely heavily on employer-based
financial education when it is made available to them, Moreover, although education replaces potentially
authoritative sources of information and guidonce (e.g. financial planners) to some extent, it primarily
displaces sources of questionable reliability (e.g. parents and friends). Rates of saving, both in general and
for the purposes of retirement, increase significantly with the provision of employer-based education.
Employees who are offered retirement education are far more likely to participatein401 (k) programs, and to
34make larger contributions to their plans. The effects of education are pafiicularly pronounced among those
least inclined to save; however, there is some indication that education stimulates 401(k) contributions among
high savers by relaxing non-discrimination constraints.
One possible criticism of this analysis is that education may change the way individuals think about
and report saving, rather than the way they behave. We are inclined to discount this hypothesis, on the
grounds that it provides far less natural explanations for the differentials between the effects of education on
flow saving and stocks of weallh, on retirement savings and net worth, and on low savers and high savers.
Nor does it account adequately for the impacton401 (k) participation,zs or the distinctive effect of
avaifc-ibili~ (rather than usage) on the 401(k) contributions of aggressive savers. It is also noteworthy that
results based on employer sumcys corroborate our central findings for 40 l(k)s (see Bayer, Bemheim, and
Scholz, 1996).
Our analysis has potentially important implications concerning the efficacy of strategies to stimulate
saving by U.S. households. Most obviously, it raises the prospect that a serious national campaign to
promote saving through education and information could have a measurable impact on behavior. Since many
employers are apparently inclined to offer retirement education in the workplace, the Department of Labor
could speed this process by taking more aggressive steps to alleviate the concern that the provision of
education might trigger fiduciary liabilities under ERISA,
2BEduca~i~n ~robablv illcrea~e~ ~wareness of401(k) plans among non-participants. Thus, if it has no effect ‘n actual
J
participation, one would expect it to reduce measured participation.
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ContinuousTable 2: Comparisons with Benchmarks
Variable and Subsample Benchmark’ Merrill Lynch MerriU Lynch
household survey,
survey adjusted
General characteristics Percent married 62.0% 73.8% 68.3 %
Percent homeowners 65.2% 81.1% 65.2%
Percent no high school degree2 11.5% 4.2% 5,2%
Percent high school de~ree2 58.1% 56.1% 56.7%
Percent college degree” 30.4% 39.5% 38,0%
Median household income’ All households 46,359 48,000 45,000
Unmarried individuals 30,544 30,000 27,000
Married couples 56,500 56,000 53,000
Single earner 46,479 45,000 40,000
Dual earner 60,846 60,000 57,000
No high school degree 25,111 28,000 20,000
High school degree 42,978 45,000 40,000
College degree 64,468 60,000 55,000
Median wealth All households 65,433 95,000 61,000
Unmarried individuals 20,161 46,000 20,000
Married couples 84,629 115,000 93,000
No high school deg:ee2 7,364 24,000 600
High school de;ree- 55,051 78,500 52,000
College degree’ 123,985 140,000 102,OOO
Homeowner 111,068 1~6,(300 126,000
Non-homeowner 1,811 4,000 4,000
Median non-housing wealth All households 21,006 35,500 23,000
Unmarried households 4,829 13,000 7,000
Married couples ~8,~50 49,000 38,000
No high school degree? 1,811 0 0
High school de reez
F
16,539 25,000 17,000
College degree- 44,910 63,000 48,000
Pensions Married women, eligibility 71,7% 70.4% 68.7%
Single women, eligibility~ 68,2%’ 64.8% 64.2%
Married men, eligibility* 71,5% 73.5% 71.2%
Single men, eligibility’ 60,4% 81.3% 80.8%
Median 401 ~) balances 8,856 10,OOO IO,ooo
Notes: 1. For general characteristics, median household income, median wealth, and median non-housing wealth,
benchmark statistics are obtained from tabulations by the Congressional Budget Office [1993] based on [he
1989 Survey of Consumer Finances and the 1990 Current Population Survey. The benchmark sample
consists of households with heads between the ages of 35 to 44. An identical subset of the Merrill Lynch
sample is used for the comparison. For pensions, benchmark statistics are based on the authors’
calculations, using the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances. The benchmark sample is constructed to
mirror the entire Merrill Lynch sample, rather than a restricted age group. All income and wealth figures
are reported in 1994 dollars.
‘-J -. Refers to maximum educational attainment of household head.
3. Refers to total income for the benchmark sample, and total earnings from employment in the Merrill
Lynch sample.
4. Refers to fraction of indicated subsample eligible for any kind of pension.Table 3: Probit Estimates for Retirement Education Offerings
Variable Eqllation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4)
Avaihbility Availability Usage Usage
Pensions RE401 K 0.990 1.02 0.397 0.389
(0.0839) (0,0859) (0,134) (0,138)
ROPEN 0.698 0.720 -0.00715 -0,00058
(0.126) (0.127) (0.183) (0.185)
R2PENS -0.495 -0.508 0,0291 0,0220
(0.164) (0.165) (0,222) (0.223)
SE401K -0,0473 0.133
(0,0845) (0.121)
Demographics MAR -0.0845 -0,0400 0.172 0.116
(0.0766) (0.0852) (0,104) (0.116)




BLACK 0.505 0.477 0,0437 0.0160
(0, 148) (0.150) (0.169) (0.171)
OTHER 0.440 0.4?6 -f3~16 -o.~09
(0.147) (0.147) (0.186) (0.186)
RED 0.0406 0.0545 0.0471 0,0560
(0.0241) (0.0256) (0,0345) (0.0363)
RAGE/100 0.433 0,465 -0.0246 0,0583
(0.652) (0.652) (0,918) (0.921)
Employment LREARN 0.111 0.118 -0.0581 -0,0430
(0.0562) (0.0575) (0.0985) (0,0996)
RSE -0,661 -0,673 0.315 0.325
(0.097) (0.0981) (0,190) (0.192)
RPART -o~07 -0,201 -0,287 -0,~98
(0, 128) (0,129) (0,194) (0,196)
Other Constant -1.97 -1,8’2 0,788 0.852





Observations 1594 1594 863 863
Log likelihood -897.3 -893,7 -456.5 -455.1Table 4: Primary Source of Advice and Information on
Retirement Planning
Raw Data Fitted, based on
multinominal bgit
Primary source of advice and
hformatkn
Education qot Education Education not Educat”mn
oNered o~erd offerti offered
Employer 7.4% 27.070 8,2% 24.9%
Financial professional ?4.3~o 23.370 25.1% 23.0%
Parents, friends, relatives 24.670 19.2% ~~,d~o 21.6%
print media 18.2% 15.4% 20,2% 14.2%
Own judgement 14.5% 9.3% 14,4% 9.5%
Other 11.0% 5.7% 9,7% 6.8%
Total all sources 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% lM.0%Table 5: Probit Estimates for Primary Sources of Advice





































































































































































































































































































































-497,4Table 6: Median Regressions for Various Mwures of Wealth and Saving:
















































































































































































Continz~edVariable Totil Retirement Tohl saving Retirement
Wealth Wealth rate saving rate
SPART 15247 -3043 -3.307 -2.744
(12511) (1965) (0.904) (0.680)
RNOWORK 16310 3134 -0.660 -1.029
(13957) (2222) (1.034) (0.780)
SNOWORK 69747 9271 -1.704 0258
(22433) (3500) (1.624) (1.234)
Other Constant -307450 -50~53 -57.66 -34.38
(32432) (5059) (4.39) (3.32)
TSCORE 60874 15~~2 1.866 1.360
(24611) (3846) (1.783) (1.355)
PARSAVE 8075 826 0.199 0.225
(1743) (273) (0,127) (0.096)
LOGTW 5.029 2.833
(0.341) (0.259)















































































































































































ContinuedVariable Total Retirement Total saving Retirem~t
Wealth Wealth rate saving rate
SPART 14603 -2869 -3.658 -1.963
(12775) (1953) (0.96?) (0.560)
RNOWORK 15458 ~906 -0,664 -1.007
(I 4322) (2178) (1.102) (0,627)
SNOWORK 69846 9519 -2,346 1,040
(23413) (3470) (1.741) (1,028)
Other Constant -306877 49684 -60.52 -35.7
(33127) (5021) (4.70) (2.73)
TSCORE 60100 15332 1.294 1.103
(25138) (3803) (1.910) (1.118)
PARSAVE 8088 846 0.262 (3279
(1778) (~7~) (O.136) (0,079)
LOGTW 5242 2.917
(0,365) (0.213)




































































































































































722Table 10: Spouse’s 401(k) Activity
Variable Equation (1) Equatin (2) Equation (3) Equation (4)
Participation Partkipation Balancm Balances




Pensions SOPEN -0.0769 -0.104 -3,682 -3,448
(0.151) (0.150) (1,184) (921)
RE401 K 0.185 o~lg 987 556
(o. 150) (0.147) (1,136) (885)
ROPEN -0.133 -0.113 317
(o. 166) (0, 165) (1:31) (960)
Demographics FEMALE -0.0494 -0,0234 -2,364 -~,70(3
(0.162) (0,161) (1,179) (925)
BLACK -0.164 -0.126 -~,~lg -1,286
(0.293) (0.292) (2,376) (1,869)
OTHER o~79 o.?70 3,763 3,401
(0.336) (0.335) (2,310) (1,818)
SED 0.114 0.121 786 782
(0.0460) (0.0458) (342) (269)
SAGE 0.00218 0,00267 194 206
(0,0109) (0.0109) (77) (61)
Employment LSEARN 0,216 O’J?’) --- 5,638 5,521
(0.0845) (0.0847) (69 1) (543)
LREARN 0.0320 0,0347 -185 -160
(0.0218) (0.0216) (175) (139)
SPART -0.503 -0.460 1,998 1,267
(0.271) (0.270) (2,120) (1,637)
Other Constant -1.93 -2,09 -57,9?6 -56,974
(1.021) (1.021) (7,747) (6,090)
TSCORE -0.596 -0.531 -~,624 -3,262
(0.571) (0.570) (4,335) (3,382)
PARSAVE -0.0145 -0.0143 210 234
(0.0397) (0.0397) (299) (235)
Obsemations 529 529 397 397
Log likelihood -247, 1 -247.8Table 11: Summary of Quantile Effects of Education on 401(k) Balances
E1’feeton Respondent’s 401(li) Balance Effect on Spuse’s 401(li) Balance
OEBRE Basicmedianregression 2,508 4Z()
(1,435) (1,085)
25th percentile 1,113 1,022
(590) (555)
75th percentile 6,084 466
(3.147) (2,947)
UEBRE Basic median regression z.s~6 1,205
(1,058) (839)
25th percentile 2,161 1,069
(502) (444)
75th percentile 2.714 436
(2,839) (2,548)